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Abstract 
 
The “visual cocktail party effect” refers to superior report of a participant’s own name, 
under conditions of inattention. An early selection account suggests this advantage stems 
from enhanced visual processing (Treisman, 1960; Shapiro, Caldwell & Sorensen, 1997). 
A late selection account suggests the advantage occurs when semantic information 
allowing identification as ones own name is retrieved (Deutsch & Deutsch 1963; Mack & 
Rock 1998). In the context of Inattentional Blindness (IB) the advantage does not 
generalise to a minor modification of a participants own name, despite extensive visual 
similarity, supporting the late selection account (Mack & Rock 1998). The current study 
applied the name modification manipulation in the context of the Attentional Blink (AB). 
Participants were presented with rapid streams of names, and identifed a white target 
name, whilst also reporting the presence of one of two possible probes. The probe names 
appeared either close (the third item following the target: lag 3), or far in time from the 
target (the eight item following the target: lag 8). The results revealed a robust AB; reports 
of the probe were reduced at lag 3 relative to lag 8. The AB was also greatly reduced for 
the own name compared to another name; a visual cocktail party effect. In contrast to the 
findings of Mack and Rock for IB the reduced AB extended to the modified own name. The 
results suggest different loci for the visual cocktail party effect in the AB (word recognition) 
compared to IB (semantic processing). 
 
 
 
 
The question of the “locus of selection” is at least as old as the study of selective attention 
itself, and in one form or another has occupied cognitive psychologists for more than 60 
years (see, Allport, 1992; Driver, 2001; Lachter, Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004; Lavie & Tsal, 
1994, for reviews). Essentially, this debate revolves around the information processing 
stage at which stimuli must first be treated selectively, with critical processing operations 
applying to some stimuli but not others. Whilst some authors argue that selection must 
occur on the basis of elementary sensory properties, before stimuli are fully identified and 
processed for meaning (e.g. Broadbent, 1958; Treisman & Gelade, 1980), others argue all 
stimuli are fully processed for meaning and are only treated selectively when it comes to 
finally reporting (e.g. Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Duncan, 1980), or acting on them (e.g. 
Allport, 1980; Neuman, 1987). A corollary to this issue is the question of the fate or extent 
of processing of stimuli that are not selected. The earliest studies of selective attention 
using ‘dichotic listening’ (e.g. Cherry, 1953) showed that participants were often 
completely unaware of gross changes to the meaning of passages of speech that were 
played to an unselected ear. Such findings were consistent with the notion that little 
processing of the unattended speech occurs beyond an elementary level. However, 
subsequent research by Moray (1959) demonstrated that certain stimuli seemed to be 
processed for meaning even when not selected. Moray (1959) showed that when a 
participant’s own name was presented in the unselected passage they did notice it quite 
frequently, an effect that has become known as the “cocktail party effect” (see also Wood 
& Cowan, 1995; Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001, for recent replications).  
 
The question of the locus of selection and the extraction of semantic information for 
unselected stimuli, is not merely of historical interest. The issue remains hotly debated to 
this day with different researchers taking quite radically different views. Various 
researchers have extended the class of stimuli that should be considered special and may 
be processed for meaning before selection. For example whilst performing a difficult visual 
search task at fixation, observers remain able to determine whether a scene contains an 
animal or a vehicle (Li, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002), which type of animal it contains 
(Poncet, Reddy, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2012), whether a face is male or female (Reddy, Wilken, 
& Koch, 2004) and even the specific identity of a particular face (Reddy, Reddy, & Koch, 
2006). However, other authors have argued forcefully against these claims maintaining 
that either only very impoverished (Evans & Treisman, 2005; Treisman, 2006) or no 
processing at all of unattended stimuli is possible (Cohen, Alvarez & Nakayama, 2011). 
One argument here is that whilst some elementary feature processing of stimuli maybe 
possible and this may be sufficient for some tasks this falls short of the kind of processing 
that is required for full identification and naming (Evans & Treisman, 2005). Another is that 
those experiments that apparently demonstrate processing of complex objects in the near 
absence of attention, have not really eliminated attention to these objects, and when 
sufficiently tough attentionally demanding tasks are used evidence for preserved 
processing breaks down (Cohen et al., 2011). 
 
A parallel debate is ongoing in the domain of visual word processing (see Besner, Risko, 
Stolz, White, Reynolds, O’Malley & Robidoux, 2016 for a review). Here the debate centres 
on variations of the classic Stroop (1935) paradigm. Participants name a target colour 
while attempting to ignore an unattended distractor word that is presented in a different 
spatial location. Some authors find interference from the word on colour naming (e.g. 
Augustinova & Ferrand, 2010; 2015; Brown, Gore, & Carr, 2001; Lachter, Lien, & McCann, 
2008), and argue for word identification without attention (see Augustinova & Ferrand, 
2014 for discussion). Others find no interference (Labuschagne, & Besner, 2015; 
Robidoux, & Besner, 2015) again arguing that cases of interference only occur when 
attention is not properly controlled.  
 
Aside from dismissing these demonstrations of the extraction of meaning for unselected 
stimuli as methodological artefacts (e.g. Besner, Risko, Stolz, White, Reynolds, O’Malley, 
Robidoux, 2016; Holender, 1986; Lachter et al., 2004; Cohen, et al., 2011), there are two 
primary accounts of these data. The first is to abandon the early selection approach 
altogether and suggest that all stimuli are always fully identified, but they must be selected 
for subsequent report. This first option was the one advocated by Deutsch and Deutsch 
(1963; 1967; see also Mack & Rock, 1998; Mack 2003 for a recent incarnation of this view) 
who suggested that there are no limitations on processing stimuli for meaning, however 
subsequently becoming aware of those stimuli and being able to report on them requires 
selection. Essentially, we extract meaning for everything around us, but the vast majority 
does not reach consciousness. The second option is to modify the early selection account 
to suggest that whilst selection generally operates early, it is incomplete, and some stimuli 
may have a special status. This option is the one preferred by Treisman (1960) and 
subsequently by a range of authors (e.g. Broadbent, 1971; Bundesen, 1990). Treisman 
(1960) suggested that whilst selection operates early, before stimuli are processed for 
meaning, it is incomplete. Selected stimuli may be prioritised over unselected stimuli. 
However, unselected stimuli are not completely blocked, but merely attenuated. 
Unselected stimuli are thus processed less thoroughly than selected stimuli, thus for 
known stimuli the quality of the evidence for the presence of one stimulus over another is 
enhanced for selected over unselected stimuli. Furthermore, Treisman (1960) suggests 
that stimuli are identified when their representations in long-term memory are activated by 
sensory evidence (an idea that has stood the test of time see Coltheart, Rastle, Perry, 
Langdon, & Zeigler, 2001 and Tresiman 2006 for a recent incarnations). Some entries in 
this store (a mental dictionary or lexicon) have a lower threshold of evidence for their 
activation and thus can reach this criterion level of activation to indicate the presence of 
the stimulus in the environment even with impoverished attenuated input. Thus ones own 
name, or entries primed by the recent presentation of semantically related information can 
be identified and reach conscious awareness, even when not selected. 
 
The idea that certain stimuli may access privileged representations is echoed in recent 
studies using naturalistic stimuli (see, Rousselet, Thorpe, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2004; Van 
Rullen, 2006). Whereas certain naturalistic stimulus categories (animals, vehicles, human 
figures) may be detected effectively in the periphery whilst observers complete an 
attention demanding task at fixation, other artificial stimuli are difficult or impossible to 
identify under identical conditions (a disk that is red on the left and green on the right, vs. a 
disk that is green on the left and red on the right, e.g. Li et al. 2002). The dominant 
account of these findings is that due to frequent exposure and high familiarity, special 
networks of representations may develop that are dedicated to detecting the features and 
combinations of features that are present in these objects (e.g. Van Rullen, 2006). This 
idea is related to the idea that the representations of familiar or important concepts are 
permanently facilitated. However, instead of the representations having a lower threshold, 
this facilitation is achieved by richer and more detailed representations, that are better 
tuned to detect these specific items.   
 
One issue for studying perception without attention is that once a stimulus is expected it is 
difficult to have participants effectively ignore that stimulus: an attentional “white bear” 
situation (see Tsal & Makovski, 2006; Driver et al., 2000). Mack and Rock (1998; see also 
Rock, Linnet, Grant, & Mack, 1992) introduced a novel paradigm for studying the fate of 
unselected stimuli in vision, that sidesteps this issue, by looking at incidental detection of 
an unexpected stimulus. Participants were informed that the task concerned size 
perception and asked to judge which arm of a briefly presented and masked cross was 
longest. Unknown to participants on the last (4th or 5th) trial an unexpected stimulus was 
presented somewhere in the display. Subsequently, participants were asked if they had 
noticed anything other than the cross and the mask. This task has many similarities to the 
dichotic listening task in audition. Over a large array of experiments Mack and Rock (1998) 
explored the factors that modulated participants awareness of the unexpected object, in 
some circumstances participants report of the unexpected object was very poor (as many 
as 90% of participants failing to report the stimulus). One factor that was shown to modify 
this so-called Inattentional Blindness (IB) was self relevance. In particular, when the 
unexpected stimulus was the participants own name the IB rate was only 10% whereas 
when it was someone else’s name it was 70%; a visual cocktail party effect. 
 
Mack and Rock (1998) asked whether this visual cocktail party effect occurred because of 
a reduced requirement for visual evidence for ones own name, essentially more efficient 
visual recognition of your own name as suggested by Treisman (1960), or whether it 
occurred at a subsequent stage of processing when the meaning of the name is accessed 
and the name is identified as belonging to the participant as suggested by Deutsch and 
Deutsch (1963). In order to test between these views they examined performance with a 
minimally modified version of the participants own name. They took the first vowel of the 
name after the first letter and replaced in with another vowel, thus ‘Kevin’ becomes ‘Kovin’. 
If the cocktail party effect is rooted in the efficiency of word recognition, then ‘Kovin’ should 
also provide evidence for the special status ‘Kevin’ representation, and the cocktail party 
effect should generalise to the modified name. This generalisation could either take the 
form of participants mistaking the modified version of the name for their own name, or 
activation of the own name representation calling for immediate selection and further 
scrutiny. Alternatively, if it is only later in processing when the name is fully identified and 
recognised as belonging to the participant that the cocktail party effect is triggered, then 
the modified name should behave just like somebody else’s name, and should be 
vulnerable to IB. The results reported by Mack and Rock (1998) demonstrated that a 
modified version of ones own name was just as susceptible to IB as someone else’s 
name. On this basis, the authors prefer a late selection account where all stimuli are fully 
analysed for meaning (see also, Schnuerch, Krietz, Gibbons, & Memmert, 2016, for 
evidence of semantic processing in the attentional blink paradigm), before the most 
important are selected for awareness and report.   
 
Other more recent work using visual search tasks, tells a somewhat different story about 
how the personal significance of a word affects visual processing. Harris, Pashler, and 
Coburn (2004; see also Bundesen 1997) demonstrated that when participants attempt to 
detect the presence of the own name amongst distractor words, performance is inefficient. 
In contrast to when the target is defined by a salient single feature like colour, own names 
do not “pop-out” to produce parallel search. However, there is some overall facilitation for 
own name targets, consistent with no more efficient visual processing of ones own name, 
but an advantage that emerges only after the name is selected. Harris and Pashler (2004) 
revisited a task introduced by Wolford & Morrison (1980) whereby participants ignore a 
word presented at fixation whilst deciding if two numbers match in parity or not. The results 
showed that when the central word was the participants own name the parity judgement 
task was disrupted. However, this disruption was sensitive to capacity limitations in the 
sense that it was eliminated when multiple words were presented, in addition it was 
maximal on the first presentation of the name but then rapidly diminished (see also Frings, 
2006, for evidence of difficulty suppressing ones own name as a distractor). These results 
suggest that name identification is subject to capacity limitations arguing against late 
selection. In addition, personal significance does not seem to advantage the early visual 
processing of a name. However, once identified our names are recognised as special and 
this can produce a transient reaction that may interrupt processing on another task, again 
a late locus for the cocktail party effect.  
 
Interestingly, Shapiro, Caldwell, and Sorensen (1997) examined the potential for a visual 
cocktail party effect in the context of the Attentional Blink (AB) using the Rapid Serial 
Visual Presentation (RSVP) paradigm. The AB refers to the difficulty participants have in 
explicitly reporting the second of two targets presented in rapid temporal sequence when 
the second target appears 2-500 ms after the first. Various models exist to account for the 
AB phenomenon, but the important point is that the AB constitutes a failure to select a 
target for report. It is thus informative to consider to what level this unselected target may 
be processed, and to explore which factors make this second target more or less 
reportable (see Dux, 2009, and Martens & Wyble, 2010, for reviews). Shapiro explored 
what would happen if the RSVP stream consisted of names, and compared performance 
for a second target that was either the participant’s name or someone else’s name. 
Participants viewed the RSVP streams and identified a single white name, subsequently in 
different blocks of trials they attempted to report the presence of a known probe that was 
either their own name or someone else’s name. When the probe was someone else’s 
name a classical AB with a typical time course was demonstrated. In contrast when the 
probe was the participants own name the AB was almost completely obliterated. 
 Although Shapiro et al. (1997) do not present direct evidence to adjudicate between an 
early or late locus for their cocktail party effect, they directly recruit Treisman’s (1960) 
attenuation account to explain their data. The authors suggested that during the AB 
processing of the RSVP stream is attenuated. Specifically, the quality of the sensory 
evidence that is used to trigger representations of the names in long-term memory is 
impoverished, as a consequence these representations are less active. However, since 
the evidence requirements or threshold for the representation of ones own name is 
reduced, this special representation will be activated to a greater extent than the 
representation of someone else’s name. Furthermore, stimuli which are supported in this 
way, are more salient and are weighted with a higher priority for report, thus escaping the 
AB.  
 
However, it seems at least equally as likely that all the names are fully processed during 
the AB, and it is only later when the name is identified as belonging to the participant that it 
is prioritised for report. In their paper, Shapiro et al. showed that the effect of name 
ownership varied according to the nature of the other items in the RSVP stream. When 
these other items were not personal names but object names then neither ones own name 
nor someone else’s name showed an attentional blink, but object name targets did. These 
findings suggest that the status of the probe as a personal or object name must be 
available to the system at some level, consistent with deep processing of the probe. In 
addition, other data from AB studies are consistent with this hypothesis. Shapiro, Driver, 
Ward, and Sorensen (1997; see also Maki, Frigen & Paulson, 1997) showed that a blinked 
target, could none the less semantically prime a subsequent item. Interestingly, Arnell, 
Shapiro, and Sorensen (1999) explored the effects of name ownership in the context of 
repetition blindness (RB): reduced reports of two identical targets compared to two 
different targets in the context of RSVP. They demonstrated less RB for ones own name. 
They suggested that this advantage was not purely the result of better identification of the 
own name, but rather enhanced “consolidation” of the own name representation once 
activated; a post-identification account akin to late selection.  
 
Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in general effects of “personal relevance” 
beyond examinations of the own name advantage. Sui & Humphreys (2012) showed that 
merely associating a random and neutral geometric shape with the self (the triangle is 
you), led to subsequent processing advantages for the shape. Thus, it appears that 
enhanced processing of self-associated stimuli is not specific to our name, but can rapidly 
generalise to novel stimuli with which we are associated. This rapid onset of self-relevance 
benefits suggests that these benefits can arise quickly and do not always stem from 
greater familiarity built up through experience. Sui & Humphreys (2015) argue for multiple 
loci for this effect both perceptual and conceptual / semantic. Studies of redundancy gains 
show benefits to processing from the presentation of multiple instances of the self-
associated shapes, both when these shapes are identical and when they are different, 
consistent with a perceptual component (tapped by identical shapes) and a conceptual 
locus, that permits generalisation across different shape exemplars. If the own name 
advantage in the attentional blink task is exclusively localised to this conceptual stage then 
it may not generalise to minimally modified versions of ones own name.  
 
 In order to account for relatively complete semantic processing of items during the AB, 
there are two theoretical strategies. The first suggested by Chun and Potter (1995) and 
drawing on Potter’s earlier (e.g. Potter, 1975) proposals, is that whilst items are completely 
processed during the AB period they remain in a fragile state vulnerable to being 
overwritten by subsequent stimuli, unless “consolidated” by a capacity limited process that 
renders the stimuli reportable. Thus, items that have special significance are likely to have 
priority for consolidation, creating the own name advantage. The second discussed by 
Shapiro, Raymond, and Arnell (1994; see Isaak, Shapiro, & Martin, 1999, for further 
development) is to suggest that whilst items are fully processed and stored in short-term 
memory, the AB occurs due to limitations on retrieving information from this system. In 
particular retrieval is framed as a competitive process, and stimuli which lose this 
competition, are not reported producing the AB. Since ones own name is likely to be 
weighted more highly and thus be a stronger competitor for retrieval it is less susceptible 
to the attentional blink. 
 
The aim of the current study was to test whether the locus of the cocktail party effect in the 
AB is in the process of word recognition as suggested by Shapiro et al. (1997) drawing on 
Treisman (1960; see also Treisman, 2006), or whether it occurs later in processing as 
suggested by Mack and Rock (1998) drawing on Deutsch and Deutsch (1963), in the 
context of IB. In order to achieve this, the current study took the name modification 
manipulation used in the context of IB by Mack and Rock (1998) and applied it for the first 
time in the context of the AB. Thus, participants in the current study attempted to identify a 
white target presented during RSVP whilst also detecting the presence of a probe item 
that was either the participants own name, somebody else’s name, or a modified version 
of these names. Will the AB be fully reinstated for a slightly modified version of ones own 
name? Such a full reinstatement would be very difficult to account for by any account 
rooted in the process of visual word recognition, but could be accommodated by a late 
selection account of the type advocated by Chun and Potter (1995) or Isaak et al. (1999). 
 Method 
Participants: A total of 64 undergraduate students from the University of Essex took part in 
return for course credit. Four participants made extremely large numbers of false alarms to 
the probe in one of the blocks (>80%), and four detected the white item very rarely 
(<30%), these participants and their partners were removed from the analysis leaving 48 
participants in the final sample (10 males), mean age 20.6, range 19-30. 
  
Design: The experiment manipulated three repeated measures factors, name ownership 
(own name vs. partner’s name), name modification (unmodified name vs. modified name), 
and probe lag (lag 3 vs. lag 8). The name ownership manipulation used a yoked control 
design, such that all participants were arranged into pairs, with each participant using the 
paired name in the partner’s name condition. This meant that each name served as a 
stimulus equally often in the own name and the partners name conditions. 
 
Equipment: The experiment was generated using Inquisit software, and was displayed on 
the screen a of 21 inch iMac computer, running Apple OS X. 
 
Stimuli: The words were black on a grey background except one the target item that was 
white. The distractors were most frequent names for boys and girls born in 1997 (the year 
of birth for most of the participants), according to data provided by the United Kingdom 
Office for National Statistics. There were two lists of distractors one composed of male 
names and one of female names. Within each list there were 30 possible distractors, 28 
default items, and 2 reserves, the reserves were used if the participant’s or the partner’s 
names were present in the default distractor set. Female names were used for female 
participants, and male names for male participants. Each word was presented for 68 ms 
with a 17 ms blank screen in between. The names were 0.6 cm high but ranged in width 
between 1.5 and 3.7 cm. The black probe names that participants were instructed to 
detect, were either the participant’s own name or a partner’s name, in separate blocks. 
Modified versions of these names were created by finding the first non-initial vowel and 
replacing it with a randomly selected vowel to create a new string. No participant had a 
name without non-initial vowels apart from one participant called Amy, who was assigned 
the modified name Amu. The specific names used are presented in the Appendix. 
 
Procedure: The experiment was divided into two major blocks of 128 trials, one using the 
participants own name and its modified form and one using the partners name and its 
modified form, the order of these two major blocks was counterbalanced. Each major block 
began with 8 practice trials and then 5 smaller blocks of experimental trials each with a 
break in between at the end of each rest period participants pressed enter to move on. On 
any particular trial the probe item when present was equally often an unmodified or 
modified name. Participants thus always attempted to detect one of two possible targets.  
 
Each trial began with a cross in the display and then participants pressed the space bar to 
initiate the RSVP stream. The name RSVP stream then began 500 ms later. Each RSVP 
stream consisted of 15 names. There was always a single white name present (this could 
never be the same of one of the black targets). The white name could appear randomly in 
positions 3, 4, 5, or 6. The participant was tasked with identifying and remembering this 
item. A black probe item was present on 2/3 of trials, on 1/3 of trials it was an unmodified 
name, and on 1/3 of trials it was a modified name, the probe could appear at lag 3 or lag 8. 
Trials with an unmodified name probe, a modified name probe, or no probe, were 
randomised within blocks. Participants were thus tasked with detecting the presence of 
one of two possible probe items. Streams of names were terminated with a mask 
composed of a string of Xs. Participants first responded to indicate whether the probe was 
present or absent by pressing either “a” for absent or “s” for present. They were then 
presented with a list of all 28 possible white items, and they used the mouse to pick the 
white name from the list. A different random order of the names was used for each 
participant.  
 
Results 
The ability to report the white target, did not differ significantly between the own name and 
partners name blocks 76 % own name vs. 74 % partners name, t(47)=1.454, p=.152. 
However, there were slightly but significantly fewer false alarms for probe detection in the   
own name 9 % vs. partners name 14 % block, t(47)=2.08, d= 0.23, p<0.05. 
 
Proportion probe detection (see Figure 1) was analysed using ANOVA with the factors of 
Name Ownership (own name, partners name), Name Modification (modified unmodified), 
and Probe Lag (lag 3, lag 8). There were main effects of Name Ownership F(1,47)= 69.4, 
η2p = 0.596, p<0.0001, Name Modification F(1,47)= 11.05, η2p= 0.19, p<0.002, and Lag 
F(1,47)= 158.177, η2p= 0.771, p<0.0001. Name Ownership and Name Modification 
interacted significantly F(1,47)= 9.28, η2p = 0.165, p<0.005. Analysis of simple main 
effects showed that while the effects of Name Ownership were significant for both 
unmodified, F(1,47)=86.4, η2p = 0.648, p<.0001, and modified names, F(1,47)=43.9, η2p 
= 0.483, p<.0001,  there was an overall cost to performance for modified names only in the 
Own name condition, F(1,47)=31.43, η2p = 0.401, p<.0001, but not in the partners name 
condition, F<1. Name Ownership interacted with lag F(1,47)= 20.65, η2p = 0.305, 
p<0.0001. Simple main effects analysis showed that the ownership effect was significant 
at both lag 3 F(1,47)= 88.49, η2p = 0.653, p<0.0001 and lag 8 F(1,47)= 27.29, η2p = 
0.367, p<0.0001. Whilst the drop in performance for Lag 3 compared to Lag 8 was 
significant in both the own name F(1,47)= 47.39, η2p = 0.502, p<0.0001, and other name 
conditions F(1,47)= 118.84, η2p = 0.717, p<0.0001, it was substantially larger in the other 
name condition consistent with a larger attentional blink in this condition (see Figure 2 for a 
graphical representation of Attentional Blink magnitude in the present study). Name 
Modification also interacted with lag F(1,47)= 19.47, η2p = 0.293, p<0.0001. Simple main 
effects analysis showed that the drop in performance for Lag 3 compared to Lag 8 was 
significant for both modified F(1,47)= 162.39, η2p = 0.776, p<0.0001 and unmodified 
names F(1,47)= 109.38, η2p = 0.699, p<0.0001. However, whilst the effect of modification 
was significant at lag 3 F(1,47)= 21.271, η2p = 0.312, p<0.0001, it was not significant at 
lag 8 F<1, consistent with a larger attentional blink for modified names (see Figure 2). 
 
Crucially the three-way interaction between all factors was not significant, F<1. To further 
assess this critical non-significant interaction the BayesFactor package in R (Morey & 
Rouder, 2018) was used to calculate the Bayes Factor indicating the relative probability of 
the full model including the three way interaction and the model excluding this interaction 
(Following the recommended strategy laid out in Rouder, Morey, Verhagen, Swagman, & 
Wagenmakers, 2017). The analysis showed the model without the three way interaction 
was 5.33 times more likely than the model with this interaction. The results suggest that 
modification does not increase the attentional blink selectively for the own name condition. 
 
Discussion 
The current study was able to reproduce the visual cocktail party effect in the context of 
the AB. The AB was approximately half as large when the probe item took the form of the 
participants own name compared to the partners name. Modification also increased the 
magnitude of the AB but to a smaller extent than name ownership. In addition Modification 
reduced overall performance in the own name condition. However, the nature of this effect 
of name modification in the own name condition was general, it did not act to increase the 
magnitude of the AB. Note that participants responded present to either a name or a 
modified name within a block of trials. Any tendency for participants to misidentify modified 
names as names making a kind of proof-readers error, would work against this name 
modification cost, and this tendency may have been expected to be more pronounced in 
the case of familiar own names. Reliable costs of modification that are in fact larger in the 
own name condition, coupled with the overall low rate of false alarms, suggest that 
participants tended not to misidentify the modified names as names. The most important 
finding was that name modification did not fully reinstate the AB for one’s own name. In 
fact, the AB was substantially reduced for both the own name and the modified own name 
relative to the partners name.  
 
The pattern of results observed here is very different to that observed by Mack and Rock 
(1998) in the context of IB. Whereas Mack and Rock reported that modifying the 
participants own name in this way fully reinstated IB, we did not observe this in the context 
of the AB. However, there were two distinct effects of name modification in the experiment. 
Firstly, name modification acted to generally increase the AB, such that the AB was larger 
for modified names. We suggest that the modification manipulation affects the efficiency 
with which name representations in long-term memory accumulate evidence for the 
presence of their referents in the environment. Thus modification likely affects the initial 
process of activating the representation of one’s own name. Participants may then detect 
unmodified and modified names by monitoring for a certain minimum level of activation in 
the name representation. Alternatively, participants may monitor for the unmodified name 
by default and only respond present in the case of a modified name after this process fails, 
this extended processing sequence in the modified name case would make modified 
names more vulnerable to the AB.  
 
Secondly, name modification has a more general effect on performance but only in the 
own name condition. At first glance this interaction appears at least consistent with a late 
selection account of the visual cocktail party effect. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that this is a general effect that is approximately equal in magnitude at both lags, it is 
not an effect on the AB. We attribute this own name specific modification effect to a 
process of self-relevance detection, that applies only to one’s unmodified own name. Once 
fully processed participants are able to appropriately attribute self-relevance to their own 
name, and this serves to improve performance with this item. The mechanism of this 
conceptual self-relevance advantage may be increased attention to the stimulus (e.g., 
Harris & Pashler, 2004; Arnell et al. 1999). However, the specific advantage that can be 
traced to this conceptual self-relevance identification does not impact the magnitude of the 
AB in the same way as it impacts the magnitude of IB. We suggest that the availability of 
this self-relevance information occurs too late in processing to affect the stages of visual 
word processing that are primary in generating the AB in this specific paradigm. Thus 
while self-relevance affects performance it does so in a way that does not modulate AB 
magnitude.  
 
The current results support the Shapiro et al. (1997) recruitment of Treisman’s (1960) 
attenuation theory to explain the cocktail party effect in the context of the attentional blink. 
We suggest that when participants attempt to detect their own name or a modified version 
of it, representations of their own name in memory are enabled and monitored as part of 
the relevant “task-set” (e.g. Monsell, 1996), in order to make a present vs. absent 
response. Another way of putting this is that participants activate a target template to 
enable target detection (e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 1998; Duncan, Humphreys, & Ward, 
1999). Overlapping representations are recruited for both the names and the modified 
names. During the period of the AB, when the white item is selected for prioritised 
processing, activation of these representations is attenuated, causing poorer detection. 
However, both the unmodified and modified names activate the same representation, and 
both forms are advantaged by a lower threshold or increased resting activation in this 
representation, allowing the advantage to be inherited by the modified own name. 
Likewise when participants are set to detect someone else’s name visual representations 
of this name are enabled and monitored as part of a different “task-set”, however since 
these representations do not enjoy permanently lowered thresholds or higher resting 
levels of activation they are more susceptible to the AB. An alternative explanation is 
similar but rather than permanent changes in the relevant representations, the effects stem 
from temporarily enhancing the activation of the relevant underlying visual representations 
once the task is underway. According to Sui & Humphreys (2012; see Sui & Humphreys, 
2015 for a review) the ability to activate these representations top-down is enhanced by 
self-relevance. Since, both the modified and unmodified names both recruit these same 
representations the benefit generalises across name modification. 
 
Why do these two paradigms AB and IB show differential sensitivity to modification of ones 
own name? The key difference likely revolves around the role of expectation and top-down 
task set. In the case of the AB the nature of the possible probe items is known in advance, 
and participants are explicitly set to attempt to detect them. In the case of IB participants 
do not expect the critical stimulus to appear and are therefore not explicitly set to detect 
the name stimulus. We suggest that in the case of the visual presentation of names there 
are no low level visual features that render ones own name more salient necessarily than 
another persons name. In these circumstances there is also no incentive to monitor 
activation in visual representations of ones own name. Thus here it is only relatively late in 
processing when self-relevance is detected and the stimulus is identified as ones own 
name that it is then prioritised for selection. In the case of AB participants have an explicit 
top-down task-set to detect a specific name, and here they are able to enable and monitor 
visual representations at earlier stages of processing, in order to complete the task. When 
participants are set in this way they may take advantage of the increased activation or 
lowered thresholds of visual own name representations, and this advantage may shared 
by visually similar strings. This may result from relatively long-term changes in the 
underlying representations due to the greater experience or familiarity with ones own 
name. Alternatively, it could result from enhanced temporary top-down activation of the 
representations underlying ones own name (e.g. Sui & Humphreys, 2012).  
 
Thus, in summary the current results point to a flexible system for selection with multiple 
and variable loci. When participants do not have an expectation for a particular stimulus 
selection for visually similar stimuli may be driven by late computations related to self-
relevance. In contrast this default setting may be overridden by top-down expectations that 
may serve to enable and permit the monitoring of activation at lower levels of the system. 
One manifestation of this top-down enabling of lower levels of the system is the 
inheritance of enhanced processing of ones own name by visually similar stimuli. 
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 Figure 1: Proportion of trials on which the probe item was correctly reported, as a function 
of Name Ownership, Name Modification and Probe Lag.  
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 Figure 2: Attentional blink magnitude calculated as (proportion correct at Lag 8 – Lag 3). 
OWN shows performance with the participants own name, PART shows performance with 
the partners name. The suffix MOD indicates performance for modified names. 
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Appendix: Name stimuli used in the experiment. 
Own Name Modified Own Name Partner Name Modified Partner Name 
Thomas Thimas Dominic Duminic 
Dominic Diminic Thomas Thumas 
Alana Alona Mishie Meshie 
Mishie Meshie Alana Alina 
Thomas Thimas Michael Mechael 
Michael Muchael Thomas Thamas 
Demi Dimi Megan Magan 
Megan Migan Demi Dumi 
Kristin Krustin Melissa Mulissa 
Melissa Milissa Kristin Krustin 
Lauren Liuren Rebecca Robecca 
Rebecca Ribecca Lauren Louren 
Nana Nuna Janvee Jenvee 
Janvee Jenvee Nana Nena 
Elliot Elleot James Jomes 
James Jomes Elliot Elluot 
Janice Jenice Katerina Kiterina 
Katerina Kuterina Janice Junice 
Charlotte Chirlotte Jess Jass 
Jess Joss Charlotte Churlotte 
Dicky Ducky Alexandru Aloxandru 
Alexandru Alixandru Dicky Decky 
Oda Odi Anna Anne 
Anna Anne Oda Odi 
Rosie Resie Brogan Bragan 
Brogan Brigan Rosie Rusie 
Tinecia Tenecia Francesca Froncesca 
Francesca Frencesca Tinecia Tonecia 
Joyce Jayce Christy Chrosty 
Christy Chresty Joyce Jayce 
Lauren Louren Amy Amu 
Amy Amu Lauren Luuren 
Alencia Alancia Monica Manica 
Monica Minica Alencia Alincia 
Feven Fiven Lucy Licy 
Lucy Lacy Feven Fiven 
Caroline Coroline Dee Due 
Dee Die Caroline Coroline 
Katie Kitie Raihanna Roihanna 
Raihanna Roihanna Katie Ketie 
Matthew Mutthew Thomas Themas 
Thomas Thimas Matthew Mitthew 
Summer Sommer Rhianne Rheanne 
Rhianne Rhuanne Summer Sommer 
Kelsey Kalsey Comfort Cumfort 
Comfort Camfort Kelsey Kalsey 
Priyanka Preyanka Megan Magan 
Megan Migan Priyanka Pruyanka 
 
 
